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This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of public debt and economic
crises of various forms.  It is a timeline of a country’s creditworthiness and financial turmoil. The analysis,
narrative, and illustrations in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries
of Financial Folly, were primarily organized around themes (serial default, inflation, etc.), although
detailed tables in the book chronicled country-specific information on the dating, frequency, incidence,
etc. of specific crises episodes by country.  The Chartbook compliments the thematic analysis with
individual country histories, and provides the grounds for a systematic analysis of the temporal patterns
of debt cycles, banking and sovereign debt crises, hyperinflation, and, for the post World War  II period,
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I. Preamble 
This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of debt and 
economic crises of various forms.  The analysis, narrative, and illustrations in This Time is 
Different, were primarily organized around themes (serial default, inflation, etc.), although 
detailed tables in the book chronicled country-specific information on the dating, frequency, 
incidence, etc. of specific crises episodes by country.
 1  The Chartbook compliments the thematic 
analysis—indeed, it fills in as documentation to its underpinnings.  What  follows systematically 
illustrates for 70 countries  the individual timeline of public and private debts, banking, sovereign 
domestic and external debt crises, and hyperinflation, starting from a country’s independence 
(and even prior to that in numerous cases) to the present.  The dating of the largest output 
declines and a country’s history with International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs since World 
War II to deal with an assortment of economic ills contribute to the chronologies. 
The individual country histories are often fascinating in their own right, highlighting that 
virtually no country has escaped unscathed from economic crises of one form or another.  In 
effect, in a number of countries, financial crises are more “a way of life” affecting all, if not most 
generations.  Black swans are not that rare. 
The prologue to this Chartbook is minimalist by design and is organized as follows.  The 
next section offers an essential guide to the country charts and the accompanying tables, clarifies 
methodological issues, and delineates the approach followed to document the vast number of 
sources referenced in this analysis.   
Section III summarizes some of the main (common or recurrent) themes and patterns that 
(collectively) the country histories reveal.  Some of these are documented in the literature while 
others merit considerable further study. These “big picture” themes include:  The repeated-game 
nature of sovereign debt crises and the fact serial default is commonplace among today’s 
                                                      
1 Reinhart and Rogoff, (2009) C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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emerging markets just as it was among advanced economies in an earlier era needs little 
commentary, as even a causal perusal of the charts display this historical pattern.  The serial 
nature of banking crises (particularly among the more developed economies prior to World War 
II) is equally compelling.   Nearly all of the 21 advanced economies in the sample record an 
impressive crisis tally, especially from the 1880s to the 1930s.  The episodes where there are 
surges in private debt before the crisis and public debts after the crisis are not only numerous but 
span across advanced and emerging economies in nearly all regions. And so on… 
The last section discusses where there are gaps in the data and overall analysis of the 
debt-crisis cycle. As such, it is a roadmap for future research, 
 
II. Key to Charts  and Methodology Notes 
For working definitions of banking, currency, debt, and inflation crises, see the extensive 
discussion in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a and 2010).  As to the crises highlighted in the country 
profiles, our focus is on primarily external sovereign default (also its less common counterpart--
domestic sovereign default) and banking crises. Many countries have a rich history of recurring 
(and often chronic) exchange rate crashes and inflation crises, particularly (but not exclusively) in 
post World War II Latin America.  We only provide limited information on these recurring follies 
in monetary history.
2 We do include, highlight and date all hyperinflation episodes, as these have 
been associated with the complete or near complete liquidation (through de facto default) of 
domestic currency debts. 
Key to charts 
Besides the events discussed above, in a few charts we highlight “near- default” episodes, 
which involve some form of international assistance to avoid a default or a restructuring.  Their 
dates are also listed in the first column of the accompanying table.  Some examples of sub-
                                                      
2 In the tables that accompany each country profile, we do provide, as summary statistic on inflation crises, 
the share of years with annual inflation above 20 per cent per annum. This inflation performance also gives 
a reasonable indication of the incidence of currency crashes, C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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sovereign defaults (by states or provinces) are also flagged.  In a few charts, historic currency 
crashes (such as the collapse of an 80-year old peg) are highlighted as well.  More mundane 
episodes of inflation and currency crises are not shown.  However, the full sample incidence 
(share of years) in an inflation crisis, is reported in the table below the chart, so as to provide 
information on chronic inflation problems. 
3  The major output collapses shown in the tables that 
accompany the charts and the numerous IMF progams since 1952 (listed as a memorandum item 
at the bottom of the table) are not depicted in the figures, to avoid compromising clarity. 
Table 1. Coloring and Shading to Highlight Events in Country Charts 
Years in default or restructuring Pale
External debt shading
Years in default or restructuring Dark
Domestic debt shading
Near default, as defined in text Bright
shading
First year of banking crises Black
line/bar
Hyperinflation Medium
(annual inflation > 500%) shading  
Insets of smaller tables and charts into the figures 
  Insets are used throughout to provide complementary information to that shown in the 
main figure.  For example, for many advanced economies, an inset plots for household credit to 
GDP from the mid-1990s to the present to highlight trends in private debts ahead of the 2007-
2008 crisis.  In other cases, these insets provide information on the maturity composition of the 
debt (public or private, as the case may be) on the eve of a banking crisis be it default or 
hyperinflation.  The distribution of public and private debt before and after a crisis also provide 
documentation of the numerous crisis cases where the government assumed important quantities 
of private debts. 
 
 
                                                      
3 For evidence on the correlation and overlap between currency crashes and inflation crises, see Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010). C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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Descriptive statistics in the tables to each country 
Descriptive statistics are mostly self-explanatory, but two particulars merit explanation.  
The first year of banking crises are listed and those shown in italics indicate that the episode in 
question was not deemed to be a systemic crisis. Near default episodes are also shown in italics 
and not counted in the tally of default. The last column provides information on the largest annual 
output declines, usually the top five, but more or less when relevant. Both the year and the 
percent decline (in parentheses) are given.  For full output collapse episodes, the interested reader 
is referred to Barro and Ursua (2009). 
The bottom portion of the table gives memorandum items on IMF programs with the 
country over the period from 1952 to 2009.  The first year of the program is listed as well as the 
total number of programs.  The relevant sources are discussed below. 
Debt ratios 
 Debt is usually shown as a percent of GDP and in a few cases as a percent of exports.  In a 
handful of cases we have debt data for the earlier part of the 19
th century but no GDP or trade 
measure to scale the debt data by.  In those few cases, we show changes in debt (often over three 
years) to provide an indication of the debt cycle.  The nominal GDP data comes from numerous 
scholars as well as official statistical sources.  For a number of developing countries we have 
more data on exports than for GDP (in all cases we have post World War II nominal GDP data).  
In these cases the charts show the actual debt/GDP ratio for the period during which GDP data is 
available (say post 1920s) and use the debt/exports ratio times the average export to GDP ratio 
(for the period during which both series overlap) to back-cast the series. 
References and sources 
Most charts list the main source as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), which has an extensive data 
appendices listing sources series-by-series and country-by-country over different subperiods. 
Additional sources listed below each graph usually indicate that we came across these sources 
subsequent to the publication. Prominent examples of the recent discoveries include: detailed C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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recent historical studies of Italian, Greek, Dutch and Swedish public debts (Maura Francese and 
Angelo Page for Italy, Sophia Lazaretou on Greek 19
th century domestic debts, Frit Bos for the 
Netherlands, and Klas Fregert and Roger Gustafsson for Sweden.)  As the sample was extended 
to include Bulgaria, Ghana, Iceland, Ireland, and Switzerland, pertinent sources for these are also 
listed in the relevant country page.  Finally, the sources for the IMF programs are Bird, Hussain 
and Joyce (2004), Mody and Saravia (2009), and the IMF’s Annual Reports for several years to 
update these studies through 2009. 
 
III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes 
This section highlights some of the issues where the collective evidence from the country 
histories are particularly illuminating. Throughout, I use country examples or specific crises 
episodes to illustrate particular points.  
 (i) Serial default is a widespread phenomenon across emerging markets and several 
advanced economies. Figures 8a and 26 for Brazil and Greece, respectively (among many more 
that are similar) call attention to this point by simply shading the years in default throughout the 
sample; the summary table also lists the timing and duration of each default spell while the tally 
entry (bottom of column 1) reports the default tally for 1800-2009.  Countries such as France and 
pain have a higher count if pre-1800 default episodes are counted. 
(ii) Prior to World War II, serial banking crises in the advanced economies was the 
norm; as the larger emerging markets developed a financial sector in the late 1800s—these 
economies joined the “serial banking” crisis club.  Country histories for Belgium (Figure 6), 
Canada (Figure 10a) among others, illustrate this pattern.  The world financial centers (the UK, 
Figure 65a and the US Figure 66a) take the lead in serial banking crises.  One can speculate that 
the less-developed economies substitute foreign bankers for nonexistent domestic ones.  As such, 
when acute sovereign fiscal difficulties arise, these become manifest in serial external default 
rather than serial domestic banking crises. C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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(iii) In light of serial debt and banking crises (not to mention chronic currency and price 
instability), it is not surprising to see a similar serial pattern in the incidence of IMF programs.  
Peru and the Philippines set the record with 24 and 23 programs, respectively.  However, IMF 
programs were not always in the exclusive domain of emerging markets.  During the 1950s-
1970s, the IMF was more like the discount window of a central bank and did not carry the stigma 
it of the default or near default cases.  Among the advanced economies, the U.K. holds the record 
with 11 programs.
4 
(iv) Private debts typically surge prior to a banking crises.  This pattern is evident in 
total external debt (a stock), capital inflow bonanzas (a flow), domestic banking sector credit (a 
stock), or any combination of these. 
5 Public debts may or may not surge ahead of banking 
crises.  Indeed, especially in financial repression cases the governments efforts to stuff its debts in 
“captive “ bank balance sheets   Procyclical fiscal policies, where the government amplifies the 
boom-bust cycle in total debt (as documented in Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003), all too 
often re-enforce the boom in private indebtedness ahead of the banking crisis. 
For external debts, see Figures 30b and 62a for Iceland and Thailand, respectively. 
Surges in capital inflows do not last forever.  When they end, countries often display the Calvo-
type sudden stop syndrome, even in crises of an earlier century in advanced economies. 
6 The 
U.S. experience during 1865-1913, shown in Figure 68b, exemplifies this behavior.  Domestic 
credit climbs sharply prior to the banking crisis an unwinds afterward—the examples form 
banking in Colombia (Figure 12b) and Norway (Figure 47b) demonstrate this time profile.  By 
contrast, the famous (or infamous) lost decade and bank debt overhang in post 1992 crisis Japan 
is evident from Figure 34b. The coverage on domestic credit boom in this Chartbook is not 
intended to be as comprehensive as public and external debt—the primary focus. However, the 
                                                      
4 Bird et.al. (2004) aptly title their paper on IMF programs “Many Happy Returns?..” 
5 The term “capital flow bonanza” is introduced in Reinhart and Reinhart(2008) and refers to a surge in 
capital inflows (over and beyond their historoic norm). 
6 Calvo, Izquierdo, and  Loo_Kung (2006), for example. C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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pattern alluded to here is strongly supported by the evidence from studies that have focused 
primarily on the domestic credit cycle. The most comprehensive in terms of country coverage is 
Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who find most booms are followed by currency crises, banking 
crises or both.  The smaller country set for the 1880-2008 period studied in Schularick and Taylor 
(2010) presents similar findings.
7  
(v) Banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises.  To 
be clear, we are referring to “domestic” banking crises, the issue of whether banking crises in the 
financial centers precede domestic banking crises and or sovereign defaults or restructurings is 
examined in some detail in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).  The reasons for this temporal sequence 
may be the contingent liability story emphasized by Diaz Alejandro (1985) and formalized in 
Velasco (1986), in which the government takes on massive debts from the private banks, thus 
undermining its solvency.
8  Even absent large scale bailouts (and without counting the post-crisis 
new government guarantees) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) establish that, largely owing to 
collapsing revenues, government debts typically rise by about 86 percent in the three years 
following a systemic financial crisis, this sets the stage for rating downgrades and, in the worst 
scenario, default. 
The list of country examples of this sequencing is too long to enumerate, we would 
highlight as illustrative, the Barings 1891 crisis in Argentina (Figure 3b), Austria’s banking crisis 
in 1931 and subsequent default in 1932 (Figure 5a) and Indonesia’s 1997-1998 banking crisis and 
1999-2000 default (Figure 32a). 
(vi) Public debts follow a repeated boom-bust cycle; many (if not most) of the bust 
phase involved a debt crisis in emerging markets.  Public sector borrowing surges as the crisis 
nears.  Debts continue to rise after default, as arrears accumulate and GDP contracts markedly.
9  
                                                      
7 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Gourinchas et.al. (2001) also document for different samples this 
boom-crisis-bust pattern. 
8  See Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008) for a framework that is consistent with these dynamics. 
9 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) on evidence on output behavior before during and after debt crises. C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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If there is an exchange rate crash associated with default, as shown in Reinhart (2002), the 
valuation effect on external debts also contributes to further increase in debt/GDP ratios. 
The boom-bust episodes are very numerous cutting across regions and time. The crisis 
episode in Figure 69 for Zambia illustrates the pre-crisis surge in public debt—as well as its 
continued climb in the early stage of default. 
 (vii) As suggested in the Diamond and Dybvig’s famous framework of banking crises, short-
term debts (public and private) escalate on the eve of banking crisis and sovereign defaults. 
10  
This pattern is also consistent with He and Xiong’s (2010) setting, where creditors' incentives to 
shorten debt maturity to protect themselves against runs by other creditors.  Most famously, 
Mexico ramped up its short-term debt issuance just in advance of its “Tesobonos” crisis in 1994 
as in Figure 40b. In the march toward hyperinflation, long-term debts disappear altogether; the 
German hyperinflation of 1923-1924 (Figure 22a)  demonstrates these dynamics.   
(viii)  Private debts become public debts-after the crisis.  Several examples from the debt 
crisis that engulfed Latin America in the early 1980s and lasted a decade are documented in 
various insets that document the rising share of private “hidden debts” carrying implicit 
government guarantees (Figure 62a for Thailand, among others)  (Figure  19a for Ecuador, for 
example). 
11
                                                      
10 See Chang and Velasco (2000) for an open-economy treatment of Diamond and Dibvig (1983). 
11 For a discussion of hidden public debt see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 1. Algeria:  External (public plus private) Debt, Default and 
Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
















Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 



























1991-1996  6  n.a.  1990  n.a.  10.4  12.5  1961(12.1) 
              1962(21.1) 
            1966(4.8) 
Number of episodes:            1971(8.5) 
1    0  1  0      1980(5.4) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number 
1989, 1991, 1994,1995        4 
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 Figure 2. Angola:  External (public plus private) Debt, Default,  
Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1975-2009 





















Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: No data is available prior to 1985 right after independence from Portugal (1975) and during the 
early year of the 27-year civil war (1975-2002).  
 




























1985-2003  19  1976  1991  1993-1996  54.3  60.0  1974 (5.0) 
    1992-2002          1975 (38.4) 
              1976 (10.2) 
Number of episodes:            1992(5.8) 
1    2  1  1      1993(24.0) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
None        0 
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 Figure 3a. Argentina:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 








External defaults (shaded) 
 banking crises (black lines)
Hyperinflations








the first and  longest 
default
Public foreign bond issues and default
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown above.  Domestic default episodes are that overlap with 
external default are not shaded (see table below for dates) 




























1827-1857  31  1890-1893  1885  1984-1985  32.5  24.7  1914(10.4) 
1890-1893  4  1982  1890  1989-1990      1917(8.1) 
1951  1  1989-1990  1914        1931(6.9) 
1956-1965  10  2001-2005  1931        1959)6.5) 
1982-1993  12  2007-2009  1934        1985(7.0) 
1989  --    1980        1989(7.0) 
2001-2005  9    1985        2002(10.9) 
      1989         
      1995         
      2001         
Number of episodes:             
7    5  10  2       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1958-1962, 1967-1968, 1976-1977, 1983-1984, 1987, 1989, 
1991-1992,  1996, 1998, 2000, 2003(2) 
    20 
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Figure 3b. Argentina: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default,  
Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1865-1895 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 
1885 and 1890 crises


















1885, banking crisis and 
exit from Gold Standard
1890 Barings banking 
crisis and default
 
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 3c. Argentina Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default, Hyperinflation 
 and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 








First year of 
the banking crisis









Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method 
is used.  Only systemic banking crises are shown. 
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Figure4a. Australia:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, 
Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1852-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
Household debt as a percent of GDP














there is a  "near-
default" 
in 1932
in New South 
Wales.







Sources:  S.J. Butlin (1968), OECD, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: An interesting anecdote on sub-sovereign debt from correspondence with Huw McKay (who also 
refered us to Butlin’s work, which dates the earliest banking crises.. During the great depression, the left 
wing government of the largest state in Australia, New South Wales, voted to default on its foreign debt, 
only to be over-ruled by the Federal Government. Only systemic banking crises are shown. 
 
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs:  Australia, 1800-2009 




























1932   n.a.  n.a.  1828  n.a.  n.a.  2.8  1882(5.6) 
      1843        1892(12.3) 
      1893        1893(5.5) 
      1931        1930(9.5) 
      1989        1931(6.7) 
Number of episodes:             
0    0  5  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1961        1 
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Figure 4b. Australia: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Banking Crises, 1865-1895 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 
1891-1893 crisis-Barings aftermath



















Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 5a. Austria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 



















Banking crisis begins in 
1931 (black lines) and default in 1932.
 1938 was the last of 7 default episodes (shaded)
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 






























1802-1815  14  1945  1873  1921-1922  17.1  13.3  1919(15.6) 
1816  1    1924        1931(8.0) 
1868-1870  3    1929        1932(10.3) 
1914-1915  2    1931        2009(3.8) 
1932-1933  2    2008         
1938  1             
1940-1952  13             
Number of episodes:             
7    1  5  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
None        0 
Notes: There is an issue whether to treat (more or less) consecutive defaults in 1802, 1805, and 1811 as 
separate episodes or as a single longer episode, as above. 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 5b. Austria: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Banking Crises, 1865-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 
 













World War I begins
 
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 6. Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and 
Banking Crises, 1835-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 









First year of banking crises 
(black lines) 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 





























n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1838  n.a.  n.a.  5.2  1932(4.5) 
      1842        1938(2.3) 
      1848        2009(3.2) 
      1870         
      1914         
      1925         
      1931         
      1934         
      1939         
      2008         
Number of episodes:             
0    0  10  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1952        1 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 7. Bolivia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt  
Default, Banking Crises, and Hyperinflation, 1914-2009 

























Banking crises (black lines)
Domestic default (dark shading)
1984-1985 hyperinflation
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. 
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports. 
. 




























1875-1879  5  1927  1987  1984-1985  21.6  14.6  1954(9.5) 
1931-1948  18  1982-1985  1994        1956(5.9) 
1980-1984  5    1999        1982(4.4) 
1986-1993  8            1983(4.5) 
1989-1997  9             
Number of episodes:             
5    2  3  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1956-1957, 1959, 1961-1967, 1969, 1973, 1980, 
1986 (2), 1988(2), 1994, 1998, 2001 
      20 
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 Figure 8a. Brazil: External Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009 

























Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: For 1824-1945, public external debt; for 1946-2009 external debt is the aggregate of public and 
private debts. Only the major banking crises are shown. There are a total of 9 default episodes but only 8 
shaded regions, as two episodes occur in consecutive years (see table below). Only systemic banking crises 
are shown. 




























1828-1834  7  1986-1987  1890  1988-1990  26.6  26.1  1893(12.8) 
1898-1901  4  1990  1897  1992-1994      1896(7.2) 
1902-1910  9    1900  or      1930(6.0) 
1914-1919  6    1914  single       1981(4.4) 
1931-1933  3    1923  episode      1990(4.2) 
1937-1943  7    1926  1988-1994       
1961  1    1929         
1964  1    1963         
1983-1990  8    1985         
    1990         
    1994         
Number of episodes:             
9    2  11  2(1)       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1958, 1961, 1965-1972, 1983, 1988, 1992, 1998, 2001-2002    16 C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 8b. Brazil: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Default and Banking Crises, 1875-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 












 (black lines); 
default (shaded)
The Barings crisis of 1890
 
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
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Figure 9. Bulgaria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1919-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 













1981-1990, only external public debt 
data available (dashed line)
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 




























1916-1920  5  n.a.  1931  n.a.  n.a.    1934(8.5) 
1932  1    1994        1990(9.1) 
1990-1994  5            1991(10.8) 
              1993(11.6) 
Number of episodes:            1996(8.0)   
3    0  2  0      2009(6.5) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number 
1991-1992, 1994, 1996-1998, 2002, 2004        8 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 10a. Canada:  Central Government (domestic plus external), 1867-2009 
(debt as a percent of exports and GDP) 















Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.  The 1983 banking crisis (also shown) does 
not meet the systemic criteria. 
 




























1935 “near”  10  n.a.  1837  n.a.  n.a.  0.7  1876(6.7) 
      1866        1919(7.6) 
      1873        1921(10.8) 
      1906        1931(15.4) 
      1908        1932and  
1933(7.1) 
      1912         
      1923         
      1983         
Number of episodes:             
0    0  8  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
None        0 
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Figure 10b.  Canada: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom 
 and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 



















Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 11. Central African Republic:  External (public plus private) Debt, Default,  
Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 













1994, a rare 100 percent
 devaluation across the 
CFA franc zone
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.   
 
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: 



























1981  1  n.a.  1976  n.a.  56.0  4.0  1979(5.6) 
1983-2009  27    1988        1983(6.0) 
Number of episodes:            1996(8.1) 
2    0  2  0      2003(7.1) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1980-1981, 1983-1985, 1987(2),  1989, 1994, 1998        10 
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Figure 12a. Chile:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1826-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 









Banking crises  
(black lines)
 
Sources: Diaz et. al (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 



























1826-1842  16  n.a.  1890  n.a.  27.1  20.3  1919(14.2) 
1880-1883  4    1899        1921(13.3) 
1931-1947  18    1907        1930(16.0) 
1961  1    1915        1931(21.2) 
1963  1    1926        1932(15.5) 
1965  1    1976        1947(10.8) 
1972  1    1981        1975(12.9) 
1974-1975  2            1982(13.6) 
1983-1990  8             
Number of episodes:             
9    0  7  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1956, 1958-1959, 1961, 1963-1966, 1968-1969, 
1974-1975, 1983, 1985, 1989 (2) 
      16 
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Figure 12b. Chile: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, 
 Default and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum) 
 









 (black lines); 
default (shaded)





Sources:.Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
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Figure 13a. China: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1885-1937 
(debt as a percent of exports) 


















Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 





























1921-1936  16  1921  1863  1946-1948  12.9  10.0  1934(8.7) 
1939-1949  11  1932  1866        1960(3.4) 
      1873        1961(17.3) 
      1883         
      1898         
      1910         
      1923         
      1931         
      1934         
Number of episodes:    1998         
2    2  10  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1981, 1986        2 
1No output data from 1939 to 1951. 
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Figure 13b. China: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom 
 and Banking Crises, 1875-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum) 














Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 13c. China: Central Government Debt Issuance (domestic plus external) 
and Banking Crises, 1981-2009 


















First year banking 
crisis
 (black line)
US subprime and 
global crisis; fiscal 





Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, several issues, National Debt Association of China, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein, and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Data on central government debt outstanding (domestic plus external) is no longer published. 
Estimates for 2008 and 2009 are based on issuance data for those years.C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 14a. Colombia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1902-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
The runup to default
























Sources: Junguito and Rincón (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 



























1826-1845  20  n.a.  1982  n.a.  35.6  17.8  1914(3.4) 
1850-1861  12    1998        1934(2.1) 
1873  1            1999(4.2) 
1880-1896  17             
1900-1904  5             
1932-1934  3             
1935-1944  10             
Number of episodes:             
7    0  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1957-1960, 1962-1964, 1966-1973, 1999, 2003, 
2005 
      18 
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Figure 14b. Colombia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 
 












The 1998 banking cisis was 







Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method 
is used. 
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Figure 15. Costa Rica: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt  
Default and Banking Crises, 1892-2009 
(debt as a percent of exports) 









6 of a total of 9 defaults/restructurings are shaded
First year of banking 
crises (black lines)
 
Sources: Soley Güell (1926), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources 
cited therein. 
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports. 
 



























1828-1840  13  n.a.  1987  n.a.  34.5  5.3  1923(7.6) 
1874-1885  12    1994        1927(9.2) 
1895-1897  3            1932(8.0) 
1901-1911  11            1934(11.8) 
1932-1952  21            1942(10.4) 
1962  1            1944(9.4) 
1981  1            1982(7.3) 
1983-1990  8             
1984-1985               
Number of episodes:             
9    0  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1961-1962, 1965-1967, 1976, 1980-1982,1985, 
1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2009 
      16 
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Figure 16. Cote D’Ivoire: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,  
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 









Almost uninterrupted ongoing 
default for 26 years (shaded) 
1994, a rare 100 percent 
devaluation 
across the CFA franc 
zone countries
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 




























1983-1998  16  n.a.  1988  n.a.  52.0  6.0  1965(2.2) 
2000-2009  10            1983(3.9) 
Number of episodes:            1990(6.9) 
2    0  1  0      2000(4.6) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1981, 1984-1986, 1988-1989, 1991, 1994, 1998, 
2002, 2009 
      11 
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Figure 17. Denmark: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,  
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 


















Accounting definition of debt 
expanded
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.  
Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown.  
 





























n.a.  n.a.  1813  1813  n.a.  0.0  1.9  1856(5.6) 
      1857        1877(2.7) 
      1877        1921(2.9) 
      1885        1932(2.6) 
      1902        2009(5.0) 
      1907         
      1921         
      1931         
      1987         
      2008         
Number of episodes:             
0    1  10  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
None        0 
1Excludes World Wars I and II.   
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 18. Dominican Republic: Central Government (domestic plus external)  
Debt, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 












1975-2001, default on 
domestic debt (dark shading)
First year of banking crises 
(black lines).




In 1985 the 1 peso to 1 US dollar peg
 in place since 1905, is abandoned
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 



























1872-1888  17  1975-2001  1996  n.a.  28.3  6.6  1965(12.4) 
1892-1893  2    2003        1985(2.5) 
1897  1            1990(5.5) 
1899-1907  9             
1931-1934  4             
1982-1994  13             
2005  1             
Number of episodes:             
7    1  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1959, 1964, 1983, 1985, 1991, 1993, 2001, 2003, 
2005 
      9 
 
 C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
  42 
Figure 19a Ecuador: Central Government (domestic plus external) 
Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP ) 









Shown are five of a total of 




In 2000, in the midst of crisis, 
Ecuador officially fully dollarized
 in place since 1905, is abandoned
  
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: For the period 1973-1989 the data is for external public debt for general government, this 
underestimates public indebtedness, as it does not include domestic (or internal) debts—at the same time 
general government is more inclusive than our central government measure.  These two effects are working 
in opposite directions. 



























1826-1845  20  1999  1981  n.a.  57.8  13.9  1983(2.1) 
1868-1890  4    1998        1987(6.0) 
1894-1898  1            1999(6.3) 
1900-1904  5             
1906-1911  3             
1914-1924  9             
1929-1954               
1982-1995               
1999-2000               
2008               
Number of episodes:             
10    1  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007         
Dates of programs        Total 
1961-1966, 1969-1970,  1983, 1985-1986, 1988-
1989, 1991,  1994, 2000, 2003 
      18 C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 19b. Ecuador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 





















crisis  and default
Ecuador dollarizes
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
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Figure 20. Egypt:  Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1862-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 









1876, the first of 2 default





Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein  
Notes: By 1945, the outstanding balance on Ottoman debts were either fully paid off or forgiven; no 
external debts are recorded through 1960. 
 




























1876-1880  5  n.a.  1907  n.a.  2.9  5.2  1887(2.2) 
1984  1    1981        1914(3.0) 
              1920(6.6) 
Number of episodes:    1990        1942(3.6) 
2    0  3  0      1991(3.2) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1962, 1964, 1977-1978, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1996         8 
Sources: Pre-World War II GDP from Yousef (2002). 
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Figure 21a El Salvador: Central Government (domestic plus external) 
Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 









 External default 
episodes (light shading)
Domestic default (dark shading);
first year of banking crisis
(black line)
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. 
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports. 
. 
 



























1828-1860  33  1981-1996  1989  n.a.  22.7  3.5  1927(12.1) 
1898  1            1931(10.1) 
1921-1922  3            1932(10.2) 
1932-1935  11            1938(7.1) 
1938-1946  21            1949(9.2) 
Number of episodes:            1980(8.6)   
5    1  1  0      1982(6.3) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1958-1963, 1965, 1967, 1969-1970, 1972, 1980, 
1982, 1990,  1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 2009 
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Figure 21b. El Salvador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 


















In 2001, El Salvador 
dollarizes
As an exception to the rule, 
El Salvador defaulted on its 
domestic debts (shaded) in 
1981 while servicing external debts.
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein  
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Figure 22a. Finland:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and  
Banking Crises, 1914-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 








First year of banking crisis
 (black lines) 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 





























n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1900  n.a.  n.a.  7.5  1862(5.4) 
      1921        1867(8.0) 
      1931        1931(2.4) 
      1939        1991(6.2) 
      1991        2009(6.4) 
Number of episodes:             
0    0  5  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1952, 1967, 1975        3 
1Excludes World Wars I and II.   
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Figure 22b. Finland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 
 













In 1992, the markka
 "crashed" during the
 Exchange Rate Mechanism 
Crisis
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method 
is used. 
 
 C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
  49 
Figure 23. France: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and  
Banking Crises, 1880-2009 

















Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 





























1812.  n.a.  n.a.  1802  n.a.  0.5  5.7  1848(6.1) 
      1805        1859(6.5) 
      1848        1870(7.6) 
      1881        1876(8.2) 
      1889        1931(6.0) 
      1907        1932(6.5) 
      1914         
      1930         
      1994         
Number of episodes:             
    0  10  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1956, 1958, 1969        3 
1Excludes World Wars I and II.  There are a couple of additional output declines comparable in magnitude 
to those shown in the latter 19
th century. 
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Figure 24a. Germany: Federal and Total Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 































Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown. 
 






























1807  1  1948  1857  1923-1924  12.9  9.5  1919(19.5) 
1812  1    1880        1923(16.9) 
1850  1    1891        1931(7.6) 
1932-1953  22    1901        1932(7.5) 
      1925        1946(52.6) 
      1931        2009(4.9) 
      1977         
      2007         
Number of episodes:             
4    1  8  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
None        0 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 24b. Germany: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom 
 and Banking Crises, 1870-1912 
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum) 











 (black lines)C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 25. Ghana:  Total Public (domestic and external) Debt, Default, 
 and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 















 crashes and high inflation
Domestic default (dark shading)
 external default (light shading)
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1966  1  1979  1982  n.a.  9.4  45.3  1955(6.4) 
1968  1  1982  1997        1975(12.5) 
1970  1            1982(6.9) 
1974  1            1983(4.6) 
1987  1             
Number of episodes:             
5    2  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
    Total   Dates of programs 
1966-1969, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987(2), 1988, 
1995, 1999, 2003 
      14 
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Figure 26a. Greece:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1848-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 

























Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Levandis (1944), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 





























1826-1842  17  1932-1951  1931  1941-1944  48.1  12.7  1847(14.0) 
1843-1859  17    1991        1852(14.7) 
1860-1878  19            1856(11.7) 
1894-1897  4            1891(11.5) 
1932-1964  33            1919(17.7) 
Number of episodes:             
5    1  2  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007         
Dates of programs        Total  
None        0 
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Figure 26b. Greece:  Government Domestic Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1884-1939 
(loans to the government as a percent of Central Bank loans) 









 (black line) 
defaults 
(shaded)
Central Bank loans to the
 government as a percent
 of total loans
Rising domestic debt in
 the eve of external default
 
Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Levandis (1944), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
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Figure 27. Guatemala: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,  
and Devaluation, 1920-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 









 External default 
episodes (shaded)
Banking crisis (black lines)
The 1-to-1 peg in place since 1900 ends in 1985
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1828-1856  29  n.a.  1991  n.a.  31.4  3.5  1922(5.6) 
1876-1888  13    2001        1931(6.7) 
1894  1    2006        1932(12.5) 
1899-1913  14            1943(33.3) 
1933-1936  4            1982(3.5) 
1986  1             
1989  1             
Number of episodes:             
7    0  3  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
    Total   Dates of programs 
1960-1961, 1966-1970, 1972, 1981, 1983, 1988, 
1992, 2002-2003, 2009 
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Figure 28. Honduras: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,  
and Devaluation, 1914-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 







 External default 
episodes (shaded)
Honduras has not had a systemic 
banking crisis in this period
The 2-to-1 peg in place since 1919 ends in 1981
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1828-1867  40  n.a.  1999  n.a.  65.1  3.5  1924(6.6) 
1873-1925  53    2001        1932(10.4) 
1981-2009  29            1933(6.2) 
Number of episodes:            1942(8.6) 
3    0  2  0      1954(5.7) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
    Total  Dates of programs 
1957, 1959-1964, 1966, 1968-1969, 1971-1972, 
1979, 1982, 1990, 1992, 1999, 2004, 2008 
      19 
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Figure 29. Hungary: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 












Wartime 1941 default lasts 
nearly 3 decades.





Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 




























1932-1937  7  n.a.  1931  1945-1946  37.0  14.1  1931(4.8) 
1941-1967  27    1991        1990(6.7) 
      2008        1991(11.9) 
Number of episodes:            2009(6.7) 
2    0  3  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1982, 1984, 1988, 1990-1991, 1993, 1996, 2008        8 
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Figure 30a. Iceland:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt  
and Banking Crises, 1908-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 










First year of 
banking crisis
 (black lines) 
Banking crisis, currency crash, 
and near default, 2007-present
 
 
 Sources: Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
 




























n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1985  n.a.  n.a.  25.0  1916(11.7) 
2007-2010  “near” 3    2007        1918(6.2) 
              1920(15.2) 
Number of episodes:            1968(5.6) 
0    0  2  0      2009(8.5) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1960, 2008        2 
1 The reported declines for 1916, 1918, and 1920 are on a per capita basis (Historical Statistics of Iceland, 
2010). 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 30b. Iceland:  External (public plus private) Debt and Banking Crises, 1922-2009 



















First year of 
banking crisis
 (black lines) 
Banking crisis, currency crash, 
"near default", 2007-present
 
Sources: Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure30c. Iceland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 










First year of 
the banking crisis
 (black line); near default (shaded)
The exchange rate crashed 
by about 95% against  the 
dollar in 2008
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is 
used. 
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Figure 31. India: Public (domestic plus external) Debt Reschedulings, Near-default,  
and Banking Crises, 1835-2009 
(debt as a percent of exports) 









First year of 
banking crisis






Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs:  India, 1835-2009 



























1958  1  n.a.  1863  n.a.  11.1  3.2  1891(9.2) 
1969  1    1908        1899(7.8) 
1972-1976  5    1914        1918(12.8) 
1989-1990    1921        1920(7.9)   
Number of episodes:    1929        1947(17.2)   
      1947         
      1993         
3    0  7  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
    Total  Dates of programs 
1957, 1962-1963,  1965, 1981, 1991 (2)        7 
Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total. 
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Figure 32a. Indonesia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1911-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
"Hidden debts" on

















100 3 default/restructuring 
episodes (shaded)  Banking crises
 (black bars)
1966, the 






Sources: Creutzberg, P. (1976), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:  
Indonesia, 1800-2009 



























1966-1970  5  n.a.  1992  1966  14.8  31.1  1931(7.1) 
1998-2000  3    1997        1958(4.7) 
2002  1            1963(4.2) 
            1967(4.4)   
Number of episodes:            1998(13.1)   
3    0  3  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
    Total   Dates of programs 
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Figure 32b. Indonesia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 











First year of 
the banking crisis
 (black line); default (shaded)
During 1997-1998, the 
exchange rate collapsed by 
about 235% against  the 
dollar; inflation spikded to 
60 percent
The "twin crisis" was
 followed by defaults
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is 
used. 
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 Figure 33a. Ireland:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt  
and Banking Crises, 1929-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
Household debt as a percent of GDP








First year of 
banking crisis
 (black line) 
Wartime 






Sources: National Treasury Management Agency, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























n.a.  n.a.    1836  n.a.  n.a.    1933(2.5) 
      1856        1937(3.8) 
              1958(2.1) 
    2007        2008(3.0)   
Number of episodes:            2009(7.5)   
0    0  4  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
    Total   Dates of programs 
None        0 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 33b. Ireland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 

















Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is 
used. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 34. Italy: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,  
and Banking Crises, 1861-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 











First year of banking crisis
 (black lines) 
Wartime default  (shaded)
 
Sources: Francese and Pace (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 




























1940-1946  7  n.a.  1866  1944  3.3  10.5  1867(8.3) 
      1887        1881(6.7) 
      1891        1892(5.6) 
    1893        1919(16.7) 
    1907        1920(8.7) 
    1914        1930(4.9) 
    1921        2009(4.8) 
    1930         
    1935         
    1990         
    2008         
Number of episodes:             
1    0  11  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1974, 1977        2 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 35a. Japan: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,  
and Banking Crises, 1885-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 












Wartime 1942 default 
(shaded) lasts a decade.









Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1942-1952  11  1946-1948  1872  1945  5.2  11.0  1896(5.5) 
      1882        1899(7.4) 
      1901        1920(6.2) 
    1907        1930(7.3)   
    1917        2009(5.0)   
    1923         
    1927         
    1992         
Number of episodes:             
1    1  8  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1962,1964        2 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 35b. Japan Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 
















Spring and fall 
2000 
burst of IT bubble
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 36. Kenya: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 














Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 




























1994-1998  5  n.a.  1985  n.a.  14.9  8.5  1952(11.1) 
2000-2001  2    1996        1953(2.5) 
            1961(2.4) 
Number of episodes:             
2    0  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1975, 1977-1980, 1982-1983, 1985, 1988(2), 
1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003 
      15 
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Figure 37. Korea: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and  
Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
"Hidden debts" on















episode (shaded) Banking crises
 (black bars)
Private external debt 
as a % of GDP








Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1997-1998  2    1983  n.a.  0.0  15.4  1920(12.3) 
      1985        1922(7.1) 
      1997        1939(10.4) 
            1951(7.7) 
Number of episodes:            1998(6.9) 
0    0  3  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1965-1975, 1977, 1980-1981, 1983, 1985, 1997      17 
Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total. 
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006). 
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Figure 37b. Korea Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP) 















The Asian 1997-1998 
banking cisis and "near" 
default.
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 38a. Malaysia:  External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and 
 Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
"Hidden debts" on


















































n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1985  n.a.  0.0  0.0  1912(7.2) 
    1997        1925(12.4) 
            1938(4.9) 
Number of episodes:            1951(5.5) 
0    0  2  0      1998(7.4) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
None        0 
 
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006). C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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Figure 38b. Malaysia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 
















Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is 
used. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 39. Mauritius:  External (public plus private) Debt, Default,  
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
1997 banking crisis















 1997 banking crisis
 (black line)
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1997  n.a.  0.0  11.9  1964(6.9) 
            1968(6.9) 
Number of episodes:            1980(10.1) 
0    0  1  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1978-1981, 1983, 1985        6 
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Figure 40a. Mexico: Public Foreign Bond Issues, Default, and Banking Crises, 1824-1910 























Banking crises, 1883, 1907,
and 1913 (black lines)




Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
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Figure 40b. Mexico: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,  
and Banking Crises, 1872-2009 

























Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1828-1830  3  1850  1883  n.a.  43.9  11.1  1902(7.1) 
1833-1841  1  1928-1932  1907        1930(6.3) 
1844-1850  7  1982  1913        1932(15.0) 
1854-1864  11    1920        1983(4.3) 
1866-1885  20    1929        1995(6.2) 
1914-1922  9    1981        2009(6.7) 
1928-1942  15    1994         
1982-1990  9             
Number of episodes:             
8    3  7  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1954, 1959, 1961, 1977, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995, 
1999 
      9 
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Figure 41. Morocco: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 














Morocco's first default was 1903-1904
 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
 



























1903-1904  2  n.a.  1983  n.a.  11.1  0.0  1981(2.8) 
1983  1            1992(4.0) 
1986-1990  5            1995(6.6) 
Number of episodes:             
3    0  1  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1959, 1965-1969, 1971, 1980-1983,  1985-1986, 
1988,  1990, 1992 
      16 
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Figure 42. Myanmar: External (public plus private)  
Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 












Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
   



























1997-2009  13  1984  1996  n.a.  21.0  37.1  1954(6.2) 
    1987          1966(4.2) 
              1987(4.0) 
            1988(11.4) 
Number of episodes:             
1    2  4  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1969, 1973-1974, 1977-1978, 1981        6 
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Figure 43. Netherlands: General Government (domestic plus external)  
and Banking Crises, 1812-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP)  
Household debt as a percent of GDP








First year of banking 
crisis
 (black lines) 
End of French rule 
and wartime default (shaded)







Sources: Bos (2007), CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
and sources cited therein. 
 
 




























1802-1814  13  1802-1814  1819  n.a.  6.2  0  1830(3.5) 
      1897        1896(3.8) 
      1914        1931(6.1) 
    1921        2009(4.0) 
    1939         
    2008         
Number of episodes:             
1    1  6  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1957        1 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
 
 C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
  80 
Figure 44a. New Zealand Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 
1860-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 
Household Debt as a Percent of GDP







First year of 
banking 
crises
 (black lines) 
Wartime 
The 1892-1893 crisis was 
common to Australia and New 
Zealand
Between 1914 and 1929 the share of domestic 
debt rose from less than 20% to about 50%






Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 




























n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1893    0.0  0.0  1876(11.6) 
      1987        1908(6.9) 
              1931(8.5) 
            1948(9.9)   
Number of episodes:            1951(7.6)   
0    0  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1967        1 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
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Figure 44b. New Zealand: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Banking Crises, 1865-1905 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 
1891-1893 crisis-Barings aftermath


















Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
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Figure 45. Nicaragua:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and 
Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 
(debt as a percent of exports)  
Runup to 1932 default
Share of 
Year short-term debt
1925 8.8 1985-1990 Hyperinflation
1927 60.6
1929 89.6 Year Inflation

















Peak debt-to-exports is 
524% in 1932 There is no private domestic 
or external debt; the domestic public
debt market disappears
(no data 1950s-1960s)




Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports. 
 



























1828-1874  47  1985-1990  1987  1985-1990  47.1  12.2  1930(19.2) 
1894-1895  2    2000        1936 (20.4) 
1978(7.9) 
1911-1912  2            1979(26.6) 
1915-1917  3            1988(12.4) 
1932-1937  6             
1979-2009  31             
             
Number of episodes:             
6    1  2  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1956-1958, 1960, 1963-1964, 1968-1970, 1972,  1979, 1991, 
1994, 1998, 2002 
    15 
 
 
 C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
  83 
Figure 46. Nigeria:  External (public plus private) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 













2004-2005 was the 
last of 5 default 
episodes.
Fleeting default 
on an oil 
warrant
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1982-1992  11  n.a.  1992  n.a.  28.0  24.0  1967(15.5) 
1986-1988  3    1995        1978(5.9) 
1992  1            1983(5.1) 
2001  1            1986(8.8) 
2004-2005  2            1987(10.8) 
Number of episodes:             
5    0  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1987, 1989, 1991, 2000        4 
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Figure 47a. Norway:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt 
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 













Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1898  n.a.  n.a.  5.2  1831(7.0) 
      1921        1848(4.7) 
      1931        1921(9.7) 
    1936        1931(7.8) 
    1987         
Number of episodes:             
0    0  5  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
None        0 
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Figure 47b. Norway: Domestic Private Credit, 1900-2004 
(Amount outstanding at year-end as a percent of GDP) 












Sources: Eitrheim, Ø., K. Gerdrup and J.T. Klovland (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited 
therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 48. Panama: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt 
and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 









sanctions; freezing of assets 
in US; bank runs and bank 
holiday; defaults on demestic 
debts (darker shading)








Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein  
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1945, hence, we scale debt by exports and adjust it by the ratio of 
exports to GDP to splice the pre-World War II series. 
 
 



























1932-1946  15  1988-1989  1988  n.a.  27.1  0  1948(5.9) 
1983-1996 
1987-1994 
14            1983(4.5) 
1988(13.5) 
Number of episodes:             
3    1  1  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1965, 1968-1975, 1977-1980,  1982-1983, 1985, 
1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 
      20 
Notes: The 1987-1994 default is on bonds, while the 1983-1996 episode is on bank loans. 
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Figure 49. Paraguay: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default,  
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 












2002 banking crisis; 2003 
7th default episode
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1874-1885  12  n.a.  1890  n.a.  22.6  11.1  1940(5.3) 
1892-1895  4    1997        1947(13.1) 
1920-1924  5    2002        1983(3.0) 
1932-1944  13            2009(4.5) 
1968-1969  2             
1986-1992  7             
2003-2004  2             
             
Number of episodes:             
7    0  3  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1957-1961, 1964, 1966, 1968-1969, 2003        10 
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Figure 50a. Peru: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1917-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 












1983, The last of 8 default
 episodes (shaded)




Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1826-1848  23  1931-1938  1872  1988-1990  40.2  13.2  1930(11.5) 
1876-1889  14  1985-1987  1983        1931(8.1) 
1931-1951  21    1999        1983(9.3) 
1969-1969  2            1988(9.4) 
1976  1            1989(13.4) 
1978  1             
1980  1             
1984-1997  14             
             
Number of episodes:             
8    2  3  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
1954, 1958-1968, 1970, 1977-1979, 1982, 1984, 
1993, 1996, 1999, 2001-2002, 2004 
      24 
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Figure 50b. Peru: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Banking Crises, 1865-1905 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 










 (black lines); 
default (shaded)
 
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
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Figure 51a. Philippines: External Private and Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default,  
and Banking Crises, 1948-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
















  debt (dash) 
Domestic plus externa public
debt (solid)
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 



























1983-1992  10  n.a.  1981  n.a.  18.8  6.3  1904(13.9) 
      1997        1923(6.1) 
              1935(6.8) 
            1984(7.5) 
Number of episodes:            1985(7.5) 
1    0  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007         
Dates of programs        Total  
1962-1968, 1970-1976,  1979-1980, 1983-1984, 
1986, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1998 
      23 
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006). 
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Figure 51b. Philippines Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default  
and Banking Crises, 1980-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 















Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is 
used. C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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Figure 52a. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation 
and Banking Crises, 1917-1947 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
1919-1923 Hyperinflation
















First year of 
banking crisis




Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 




























1936-1937  2  n.a.  1931  1919-1923  31.5  18.5  1980(-6.0) 
1940-1952  13    1934  1990      1981(10.0) 
1981-1994  14    1991        1990(7.2) 
            1991(7.0)   
Number of episodes:             
3    0  3  1       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
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Figure 52b. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation 
and Banking Crises, 1984-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
Hidden debts?
Share of




















 Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
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Figure 53. Portugal: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1851-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 
Household debt as a percent of GDP











1892, the last of 6 default
 episodes (shaded)
1890, 1923, 1931
 the first year of 
banking crises 
(black lines)








Sources: OECD, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 




























1828  1  n.a.  1828  n.a.  11.0  9.5  1918(5.1) 
1837-1841  5    1846        1928(9.7) 
1850-1856  7    1890        1935(5.3) 
1892-1901  10    1920        1936(7.6) 
      1923        1940(6.5) 
      1931         
Number of episodes:             
4    0  6  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
1977, 1978, 1983        3 
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Figure 54. Romania: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
























Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 



























1933-1958  26  1933-1958  1931  n.a.  22.6  9.8  1989(5.8) 
1981-1983  4    1990        1990(5.6) 
1986  1            1991(12.9) 
            1997(6.1) 
Number of episodes:            2009(7.2) 
3    1  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
1975, 1977, 1981, 1991-1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 
2001, 2004, 2009 
      10 
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Figure  55a. Russia: Public Foreign Bond Issues and Default, 1815-1945 



















300 The first 3 of 5 
defaults (shaded); 
first year of banking 
crises black lines
1917-1918, domestic debts






Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 




























1839  1  1917-1918  1862  1918-1924  38.8  13.8  1992(14.5) 
1885  1  1947  1875  1993      1993(8.7) 
1918-1986  69  1957  1896        1994(12.7) 
1991-1997  7  1998-1999  1995        1998(5.3) 
1998-2000  3    1998        2009(7.9) 
    2008         
Number of episodes:             
5    4  6  2       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
1992, 1995-1996, 1999        4 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 55b. Russia:  External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, 
and Banking Crises, 1985-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 













 (black bars). 1998-banking 
and renewed default





Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein  
 C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 56. Singapore: Central Government (domestic and external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1969-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 


















Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes:  Since the mid-1990s all public debts of the central government are domestic. 
 



























n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1982  n.a.  0.0  2.2  1964(3.5) 
              2001(2.4) 
Number of episodes:            2009(2.0) 
0    0  1  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
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Figure 57a. South Africa: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1911-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 








1985-1987, multilateral trade sanctions 
and first two default episodes 
(shaded)
Banking crises (black lines)
1989, banking





Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: South Africa, 1800-2009 




























1985-1987  3  n.a.  1865  n.a.  5.0  1.0  1983(1.8) 
1989  1    1877        1992(2.1) 
1993  1    1890        2009(1.8) 
    1977         
Number of episodes:    1989         
3    0  4  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
1958, 1961, 1976(2), 1982-1983        6 
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Figure 57b.South Africa: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Banking Crises, 1865-1895 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 
1890 Barings crisis

















Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure  58a. Spain: Short-term Loans to the Crown and Defaults, 1601-1679 





















 3 of a total of 13
 defaults (shaded)
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 

























1557-1560  4  1557-1560  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.     
1575-1577  3  1575-1577           
1596-1597  2  1596-1597           
1607  1             
1627  1             
1647  1             
Number of episodes:             
6    3  0  0       
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Figure 58b. Spain: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1850-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 











1877, the last of 13 defaults 
(shaded) since 1557
First year of 
banking crises
 (black lines) 
1920, 1931,1977, and 2008
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 




























1809  1  1936-1939  1814  n.a.  23.8  3.8  1868(10.1) 
1820  1    1829        1874(8.4) 
1831-1834  4    1846        1896(8.0) 
1837-1867  31    1920        1936(22.3) 
1851  -    1931        1937(8.3) 
1877-1882  7    1977         
Number of episodes:    2008         
6    0  6  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
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Figure 58c.Spain: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Banking Crises, 1865-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum) 











The last of 13 
sovereign 
defaults that 
began in 1557 
(shaded)
From 1875 onwards all capital flows are private
 
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 58d. Spain Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default  
and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average) 
 













Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. 
Notes:  For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is 
used. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 59. Sri Lanka: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,  
and Banking Crises, 1950-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 



























1979  1  1996  1989  n.a.  6.5  3.2  1918(-6.5) 
1981-1983  3            1930(4.0) 
            1935(5.2) 
Number of episodes:            1944(5.5) 
2    1  1  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
1965-1966, 1968-1969, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1979,  1983, 1988, 
1991, 2001, 2003(2) 
    14 















Two default episodes 
(shaded)
First year of 
banking crises 
(black lines)C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
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Figure 60a. Sweden: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1719-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 











First year of 
banking crises 
(black lines) 
1811, Sweden's only default
 episode (shaded); 
unclear whether it involved
external debts
Three-year inflation reaches 258 %-
the highest this 300 year-period
 
Sources: Fregert, K och R. Gustafsson, (2008), "Fiscal Statistics for Sweden 1719-2003", Research in 
Economic History, volume 25, 137-191, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes:  Prices are far more volatile during pre-World War II.  For this reason, and owing to the fact that 
deflation is about as likely as inflation prior to the rise of fiat money, we also examine the evolution of 
(smoother) three year changes in the price level. 
 





























1811  1  n.a.  1811  n.a.  0.5  1.9  1826(8.9) 
      1876        1838(5.7) 
      1897        1861(5.7) 
      1907        1921(3.7) 
      1922        2009(4.2) 
      1931         
      1991         
Number of episodes:             
1    0  6  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
None        0 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
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Figure 60b. Sweden Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default  
and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP) 
 









First year of 
the banking crisis
 (black line)
Domestic credit aggregate expanded 
coverage, 2002-2009






Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 61. Switzerland:  Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt 
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
 
 















Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 
 





























n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1870  n.a.  n.a.    1854(11.1) 
      1910        1860(13.0) 
      1921        1867(12.1) 
      1931        1877(9.7) 
Number of episodes:    1933        1975(7.3) 
0    0  5  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number of years 
None        0 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006). C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 62a. Thailand: Public (domestic and external) and External (public and private) Debts, 
 “Near-default”, and Banking Crises, 1913-2009 
(debt as a percent of exports) 

















Public (domestic and external debt)
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 




























1997-1998   “near” 2  n.a.  1983  n.a.  0.0  9.0  1919(4.2) 
    1996        1942(9.0) 
            1945(6.8) 
Number of episodes:            1998(10.5) 
0    0  2  0      2009(2.3) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number 
1978, 1981-1982, 1985, 1997        5 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 62b. Thailand Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP) 


















Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 63. Tunisia:  External (public plus private) Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 








 1991was the first year of 
a banking crisis
 (black line) which lasted 
5 years




Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 
 



























1867-1870  4  n.a.  1991  n.a.  13.0  0.0  1955(5.1) 
1956  1            1957(4.1) 
1958  1            1959(4.2) 
1963  1             
1979-1982  4             
Number of episodes:             
5    0  1  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number 
1964-1967, 1969-1970, 1986, 1988        8 
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Figure  64a. Turkey: External Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises 1854-2009 
(debt as a percent of exports) 










Banking crises  
(black lines)
2000-2001 banking crisis 
and "Near" default
 
Sources: Pamuk (1995), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
 
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Turkey, 1800-2009 




























1876-1881  6  n.a.  1931  n.a.  19.5  35.6  1927(9.1) 
1915-1928  14    1982        1932(6.0) 
1931-1932  2    1991        1994(5.5) 
1940-1943  4    2000        2001(5.7) 
1959  1            2009(5.6) 
1965  1             
1978-1979  2             
1982  1             
2000-2001 
“near” 
2             
             
Number of episodes:             
8    0  4  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number 
1961-1970, 1978-1980, 1983-1984, 1994, 1999, 2002    18 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. 
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Figure 64b. Turkey: External Public and Private Debts, Default, Near-default, 
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 











 (shaded) Banking crises
 (black bars)
1982 was both a default 
and banking crisis. The






Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure  65a. United Kingdom:  Central Government Debt, Restructurings, 
and Banking Crises, 1692-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 








First year of 
banking crisis
 (black lines) 
Debt restructuring (shaded)
In 1932, World War I 
debts are restructured.
 
Sources: UKpublicspending, (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs:  





























n.a..  n.a.  1822  1810  n.a.  n.a.  2.4  1919(10.9) 
    1834  1815        1920(6.0) 
    1888-1889  1825        1921(8.1) 
    1932  1837        1931(5.1) 
      1847        2009(4.9) 
      1857         
      1866         
      1878         
      1890         
      1974         
      1984         
      2007         
Number of episodes:             
0    4  12  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1956-1958, 1961-1964, 1967, 1969, 1975, 1977        11 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. 
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 65b. United Kingdom Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP) 
   
 










First year of 
banking crises
 (black lines)




Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 66a. United States:  Central Government Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1790-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 









1873-1884, 10 states in 
default (shaded)
First year of 
banking crises
 (black lines) 








Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein 
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs:  





























1790  1  1790  1814  n.a.  n.a.  1.4  1908(10.8) 
    1841-1842   1818        1914(7.7) 
    1873-1884  1836        1930(8.6) 
    1933  1841        1932(13.1) 
      1857        1946(10.1) 
      1861         
      1864         
      1873         
      1884         
    1890         
    1907         
    1914         
    1929         
    1984         
Number of episodes:    2007         
1    2  15  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1963-1964        2 
Notes: The default of US states are not counted in the tally as the total number of episodes refers to 
sovereign credit events only. 
1Excludes World Wars I and II. C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 





Figure 66b. United States: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Banking Crises, 1865-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports) 











Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
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Figure 66c.  United States: Private Debt Outstanding, 1916-2009  
(end-of- period stock of debt as a percent of GDP) 








First year of 
banking crises
 (black lines) 
1933, suspension of the Gold Clause
default (shaded)
 
Notes:  Data for 2009 is end-of-June.  The Flow of Funds is reported for 1945-2009; prior to that the 
Historical Statistics of the United States series is scaled (down) to match the Flow of Funds data. 
Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States, Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, OECD, World Bank, Global 
Development Finance, and  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) and sources cited therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 66d. United States Banking Survey: Domestic Credit 
and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP) 










First year of 
banking crises
 (black lines)
Spring and fall 2000, 
burst of IT bubble
Savings and loan decade-long episode
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
sources cited therein. C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 67a. Uruguay: Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Restructuring, 
and Banking Crises, 1871-2009 
(debt as a percent of exports) 















2003, The last of 9 
default
 episodes (shaded)




Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
Notes: For the period 1871-1914 only external debt data is available. Domestic debts (only a few 
observations are available) was negligible during this period. 
 




























1876-1878  3  1932-1937  1893  n.a.  13.0  18.0  1905(10.1) 
1891  1    1898        1914(16.7) 
1915-1921  7    1971        1920(12.8) 
1932-1938  7    1981        1931(17.3) 
1965  1    2002        1933(12.5) 
1983-1985  3            1982(9.3) 
1987  1             
1990-1991  2             
2003  1             
Number of episodes:             
9    1  5  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1961-1962,  1966,  1968,  1970,  1972,  1975-1977,  1979-1981, 
1983, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1997, 1999-2002 
    21 C.M. Reinhart 
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Figure 67b. Uruguay: Total (private and public) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and 
 Default, and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)  

















Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
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Figure 68. Venezuela: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1921-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 















By 1930 Venezuela had paid off all its external debts.
 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 




























1826-1840  15  1995-1997  1978  n.a.  35.9  11.0  1914(12.6) 
1848-1859  12  1998  1993        1931(19.2) 
1860-1862  3            1942(12.6) 
1865-1881  17            1989(8.6) 
1892  1            2002(8.9) 
1898-1905  8             
1983-1988  6             
1990  1             
1995-1997  3             
2004-2005  2             
Number of episodes:             
10    2  2  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total number 
1960, 1989, 1996      3 
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Figure 69. Zambia:  External (public plus private) Debt, Default, 
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
















Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 




























1983-1994  12  n.a.  1995  n.a.  24.0  40.0  1966(5.5) 
            1977(4.9) 
Number of episodes:            1994(13.3) 
1    0  1  0       
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total  
1973, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1983-1984, 1986, 1995(2), 1999, 2004, 
2008 
    12 
 
 C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
  124 
Figure 70. Zimbabwe: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Restructuring,  
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 
(debt as a percent of GDP) 
Highest Monthly Inflation Rates in History  
Country Month with Highest monthly Equivalent    Time required 
highest rate  inflation rate daily rate for prices to double
Hungary  16984.00 1.30 x 1016%  1.95 15.6 hours
Zimbabwe  39753.00 796000000.00 0.98 24.7 hours
Yugoslavia  34335.00 3130000.00 0.65 1.4 days
Germany  8675.00 295.00 0.21 3.7 days
Greece  16377.00 113.00 0.17 4.5 days
China  18019.00 42.10 0.13 5.6 days










crisis  (black line)
since 1995
Defaults
 (shaded); latest is ongoing 
Prior default, 1965-1974
 
Sources: Hanke (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
 




























1965-1974  10  2006  1995  2006-2009  40.0  40.0  1977(8.0) 
2000-2009  10            1992(8.4) 
              2000(7.3) 
Number of episodes:            2003(10.4) 
2    1  1  1      2008(14.1) 
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009         
Dates of programs        Total 
1981, 1983, 1992 (3), 1998, 1999      7 
 C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
  125 
References 
 
Barro, Robert J. and José Ursúa (2008). “Macroeconomic Crises Since 1870,” NBER Working 
Paper 13940, April. 
 
Bassino, Jean-Pascal, and Pierre van del Eng, (2006) “New Benchmark of Wages and GDP, 
1913-1970, mimeograph Montpellier University, France, 20 
 
Bird, G. M. Hussain, J.P. Joyce (2004).  “Many Happy Returns: Recidivism and the IMF,” 
Journal of International Money and Finance Vol.23, Issue 2, March, 231-251. 
  
Bos, F. (2007). “The Dutch fiscal framework; history, current practice and the role of the CPB,” 
CPB Document 150. 
 
Butlin, S. J. (1968) Foundations of the Australian monetary system, 1788-1851 (Sydney: Sydney 
University Press). 
 
Calvo, Guillermo A., Alejandro Izquierdo, and Rudy Loo-Kung (2006)  “Relative Price Volatility 
Under Sudden Stops: The Relevance of Balance Sheet Effects,” Journal of International 
Economics  9(1): 231–254. 
 
Chang, Roberto and Andres Velasco, “A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2), 2001, 489-517. 
 
Creutzberg, P. (1976) Changing Economy in Indonesia; in volume 2, Public Finance 1816-1939, 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
 
Diamond, Douglas, and  Philip Dybvig. (1983), “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity”, 
Journal of Political Economy, June, vol. 91, no. 3,401–19. 
 
Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos (1985), “Goodby Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash,” Journal 
of Development Economics 19.  
 
Eitrheim, Ø., K. Gerdrup and J.T. Klovland (2004). "Credit, banking and monetary 
developments in Norway 1819-2003", 377-408 Chapter 10 in Eitrheim, Ø., J.T. 
Klovland and J.F. Qvigstad (eds.), Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway 1819-
2003, Norges Bank Occasional Papers no. 35, Oslo, 2004, 377-408. 
 
Francese Maura and Angelo Pace (2008), “Il debito pubblico italiano dall’Unità a oggi. Una 
ricostruzione della serie storica”, Banca d'Italia, Occasional paper no. 31, Roma 
 
Fregert, K. och R. Gustafsson, (2008), "Fiscal Statistics for Sweden 1719-2003", Research in 
Economic History, Volume 25, 137-191. 
 
Gold, Joseph (1970) Stand-by arrangements of the International Monetary Fund, (Washington 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund). 
 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, Rodrigo Valdes, and Oscar Landerretche (2001). “Lending Booms: 
Latin America and the World.” Economia, Spring, pp. 47-99. 
 C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
  126 
Hanke, Steve H.  (2008) “New Hyperinflation Index (HHIZ) Puts Zimbabwe Inflation at 89.7 
Sextillion Percent.” Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute. (November ) 
(http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe) 
 
He, Zhiguo and Wei Xiong, (2010) “Dynamic Debt Runs,” University of Chicago and Princeton 
University, mimeograph, February. 
 
Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), http://www2.stjr.is/frr/thst/rit/sogulegt/english.htm#8 
 
Junguito, Roberto and Hernán Rincón (2004). "La política fiscal en el siglo XX en Colombia", 
Borradores de Economía, No. 318, Banco de la República. 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart, (1999). “The Twin Crises: The Causes of 
Banking and Balance of Payments Problems”, American Economic Review, Vol.89 No.4, 
June, 473-500. 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela, Carmen M. Reinhart and Carlos A.Végh( 2004) “When It Rains, It Pours: 
Procyclical Capital Flows and Policies”, with. in Mark Gertler and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 
eds. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004.  Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 11-53 
 
Kostelenos, G. S. Petmezas et. al. (2007), 'Gross Domestic Product 1830-1939", Sources of 
Economic History of Modern Greece, Historical Archives of the National bank of Greece 
 
Lazaretou, Sophia  (2005) “Greek Monetary Economics in Retrospect: The Adventures of the 
Drachma," Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Vol. 34, No. 3, 331–
370. 
 
Levandis, John Alexander, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1944).  
 
Mendoza, Enrique G. and Marco E. Terrones (2008). “An Anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence 
from macro Aggregates and Micro Data,  NBER Working Paper 14049, May. 
 
Mody, Ashoka and Diego Saravia (2008). "From Crisis to IMF-Supported Program: Does 
democracy impede the speed required by financial markets?," IMF Working Paper 
08/276. 
 
National Treasury Management Agency, Ireland (2010) “National Debt of Ireland: 1923-2009” 
http://www.ntma.ie/NationalDebt/historicalData1.php. 
 
Pamuk, Sevket (1995), Ottoman ForeignTrade in the 19
th Century, Historical Statistics Series, 
Volume 1 (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics). 
 
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Vincent R. Reinhart , “Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View 
of the Past and Present,” in Jeffrey Frankel and Francesco Giavazzi (eds.) NBER 
International Seminar in Macroeconomics 2008, (Chicago: Chicago University Press for 
NBER, 
 
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2008), “The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt” 
NBER Working Paper 13946, April.  
 C.M. Reinhart 
Chartbook 2010 
  127 
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton Press). 
 
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2010), “From Financial Crash toDebt Crisis,” 
NBER Working Paper. 
 
Schularick, Moritz, and Alan M. Taylor, (2010), “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, 
Leverage Cyvles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008,”  
  
Soley Güell, Tomas, Historia Monetaria de Costa Rica, (San Jose, Costa Rica: Imprenta 
Nacional, 1926). 
 
Stone, Irving (1999) The Global Export of Capital from Great Britain, 1865–1914 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press).   
 
UKpublicspending, (2010), http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk 
 
Velasco, Andres. "Financial and Balance-of-Payments Crises." Journal of Development 
Economics, October 1987, 27(1/2), 263-83. 
 
Yousef, Tarik M., “Egypt’s Growth Performance Under Economic Liberalism: A Reassesment 
with New GDP Estimates, 1886-1945,” Review of Income and Wealth 48, December 
2002, 561-579. 
 